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INTRODUCTION 
 
As federal countries are composed of at least two levels of government, the interactions between 
federal and subnational governments can be the subject of economic analysis. An important and 
well studied issue relating to federal governments is fiscal federalism and the possible 
externalities caused by the existence of federal and subnational taxation of the same tax base. The 
consequences of the existence of fiscal federalism can be both beneficial and inefficient. These 
inefficiencies are found, for example, in the form of horizontal externalities (tax competition) and 
vertical externalities. 
 
Several empirical studies have examined these possible inefficiencies: in the United States such 
as Besely and Rosen (1998) on the taxation of gasoline and cigarettes, in Canada such as Hayashi 
and Boadway (2001) on the taxation of corporate income and Esteller-Moré and Solé-Ollé (2002) 
on the taxation of personal income, and in the OCDE countries such as Goodspeed (2000) on the 
taxation of personal income. 
 
The main goal of this research paper is to empirically determine the interactions that may exist 
between the taxation of personal income in Canada by both the provincial and the federal levels 
of government for the 1981-2004 period. By doing so, it will be possible to analyse the existence 
of vertical and horizontal externalities as a result of taxation of the same tax base by those two 
levels of government. In other words, the main question is: how do provinces respond to a 
federal and other provincial tax rate modifications?   
 
This research paper is divided in three sections: The first is the literature review of studies on 
fiscal federalism .In this section we describe the theoretical background supporting the model we 
develop and empirically estimates. The second is a description of the data and the variables used 
to estimate the model. The third is the results of the unit root and cointegration tests, as well as 
the results of our estimations. We end with the conclusion and potential extensions of this 
research. 
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SECTION I. - LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
1.1 Theoretical Model 
 
As labour is a potentially mobile resource, the fiscal policies of governments may affect the 
decision of an individual to move from one jurisdiction to another jurisdiction where the 
available set of public goods and taxes would increase the individual’s utility.  The mobility of 
labour can induce individuals with similar preferences to congregate together in localities, 
however, some inefficiencies may arise as a consequence of decentralized decisions. The 
different choices made by local governments regarding taxation and the provision of public 
goods can induce fiscal externalities, causing an inefficient allocation of labour across 
jurisdiction (Boadway, Wildasin, 1984). These fiscal externalities can be both vertical and 
horizontal. 
 
1.1.1 Vertical Externalities 
 
The theoretical model that is the basis of our empirical study is the one described by Esteller-
Moré and Solé- Ollé (2002). It is assumed that each subnational unit will maximise the indirect 
utility function of a representative household (taxpayer) subject to its budget constraint. As 
considered in most of the theoretical literature on fiscal interaction, the provinces behave as 
Nash, implying that a province will take as given the federal government’s tax rates. Thus, the 
provincial government will maximise the indirect utility function given by the net wage rate 
( )nwv  and the utility given by the federal and provincial level of public goods ( ( ) ( )GHgh , , 
respectively), subject to the sum of the provincial revenues and other exogenous 
revenues, ( ) xogwlwt n Re+⋅⋅ , where t is the provincial tax rate, w is the wage, ( )nwl  is the 
labour supply function, and xogRe  are exogenous revenues such as lump-sum grants. 
Mathematically, this maximization problem can be written as:  
 
( ) ( ) ( )[ ]GHghwv n
t
++max , subject to g = ( ) xogwlwt n Re+⋅⋅  
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The result of the first order condition of the utility maximisation is that the marginal benefit of 
public goods equals the marginal cost of public funds: 
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛−
=
l
lt
h
'1
1'  or MB=MCPF. 
 
One should note that the provincial tax rates appear only in the calculation of the marginal cost of 
public funds, as the provincial tax setting function can be written as ( ))Re,, xogwTft = .In this 
case, the province is neglecting the federal tax rate and by doing so, underestimating the marginal 
cost of taxation and consequently sets a higher tax rate with respect to what would be socially 
efficient.  
 
Also, from the maximisation problem, it is possible to set the provincial tax rate as a function of 
the federal tax rate, the gross wage rate, and other exogenous revenues the province receives. The 
vertical externality comes from the fact that ∂t/∂T ≠ 0. The sign of this vertical interaction can be 
positive or negative. Facing an increase in the federal tax rate, the province can either increase or 
decrease its own tax rate, on the effect on the marginal benefit of public goods and on marginal 
cost of public funds. In other words, from the point of view of the marginal benefit of public 
goods, if the federal tax rate increases, the revenue of provinces decreases and so to offer the 
same level of public goods as before, the province will have to increase its tax rate and thus the 
expected sign of the interaction is positive. From the point of view of the marginal cost of public 
funds, however, the effect on the provincial tax rate is ambiguous. Since an increase in the 
federal tax rate results in a smaller tax base either through the departure of individuals to other 
tax authorities or through an increase in tax evasion, the marginal cost of public funds is 
necessarily affected. This effect may be positive or negative. Should the marginal cost of public 
funds increases due to the departure of high income individuals or greater tax evasion, an 
increase of the provincial tax rate would be necessary to obtain the required revenues and 
compensate for the higher marginal cost. However, if the marginal cost of public funds decreases 
through a departure of lower income, the effect on the provincial tax rate is negative. 
 
 
 4
1.1.2 Horizontal Externalities 
 
The horizontal tax externality, on the other hand, exists as a consequence of possible tax 
competition between provinces. As we are dealing with income taxation, the problem appears 
because labour should be considered as a mobile factor. As provinces know they can loose a part 
of their tax base as a consequence of migration, it is assumed that the provincial governments are 
in a ‘prisoner’s dilemma’ .This consideration leads us to the result that a given province will set 
its tax rate too low and leading to inefficiency. The maximisation problem here is analogous to 
the one described for the vertical externality problem and is also based on Esteller-Moré and 
Solé- Ollé (2002). The difference is that now labour is a mobile factor and we take into 
consideration the migration function of mobile taxpayers living in a given province. The group of 
mobile labours will choose where to live when the wage rate equals to the marginal productivity 
of labour: 
 
jiTtfTtf jjii ≠∀−−=−− ),1()1( '' ,  
 
The migration function is a function of its own provincial tax rate, the other provincial tax rate, 
and the federal tax rate. The problem can be written as: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )[ ]GHghkv i
t
++max  , subject to igp = ( ) xoglpknwt iiii Re+⋅+⋅  and ),,( ; Tttfn iii −=  
 
Where: 
in = migration function of mobile taxpayers living in province i. 
ip  = immobile taxpayers in province i. 
iw  = wage of mobile labours. 
ik  = wage of immobile labours. 
it  = provincial tax rate of province i. 
T  = federal tax rate. 
G and g = federal and provincial levels of public goods. 
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l = labour supply. 
 
The first order condition is also MCPF = MB or  
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So, the provincial tax rate is a function of the other provinces’ tax rates, the federal tax rate, the 
number of immobile tax payers and mobile taxpayers, and other exogenous revenues. 
 
If a province decreases its tax rates, the number of people migrating out of it will also decrease 
and may even be replaced by in-migration, but if the other provinces tax rates decrease, the 
number of people migrating out will increase. The impact of a change in the federal tax rate on 
migration is ambiguous. The first order condition of the maximisation problem gives us the 
provincial tax setting function. The provincial tax rate is now function of the federal tax rate, the 
other provincial tax rates, the population of each province, the number of immobile labour within 
the province and the other exogenous revenues. The tax interaction has an ambiguous effect. In 
the model described, if province j increases its tax rate, this will cause an increase in its revenue 
and this will also increase the revenue of province i as a consequence of the inflow of tax base. 
The marginal benefit of public goods decreases and province i will, in response to this fact, 
decrease its own tax rate. The sign of the effect on the marginal cost of public funds is, however, 
ambiguous as in the case of vertical interactions. Again, the sign of the interaction that may exist 
between the different provincial tax rates is determined empirically.  
 
1.1.3 Equalization Grants 
 
Finally, as one of the characteristics of Canada is the existence of equalization grants, it is 
interesting to analyse how the presence of this particularity affects the setting of provincial tax 
rates. “The transfer is calculated as the difference between the amount of revenue that would be 
raised per capita by applying a national average provincial tax rate to a standard set of national 
tax bases and the amount that would be raised by applying the same national average tax rate to 
a recipient province’s own tax bases” (Hayashi and Boadway, 2001, p.482). Also, “in federal 
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systems, intergovernmental transfer programs are frequently designed and implemented to serve 
regional equity objectives and promote efficient tax and fiscal policies for subnational 
governments” (Smart, 1998, p.189). They also point that the existence of equalization grants may 
lead to distortionary tax policies. This distortion takes the form of a province setting tax rates too 
high. “To the extent that local tax bases are elastic with respect to distortionary tax rates, 
provinces can induce larger equalization transfers by increasing tax rate” (Smart 1998, p. 190). 
The argument for this distortion is that as tax rates increase, the tax bases decrease (as economic 
activities may shift to other provinces), leading to an increase in equalization entitlement. “Thus 
the grants in effect compensate for a portion of the marginal deadweight loss of tax increases” 
(Smart 2007, p.1189). 
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1.2 Literature Review of Empirical Studies 
 
As mentioned in the last section, the first source of tax interaction arises from vertical 
externalities. As pointed by Esteller-Moré and Solé-Ollé (2001), vertical externalities in the 
design of tax policy arise mainly as a result of concurrent taxation. This means that both federal 
and local governments have the power to tax the same tax base.  
 
Empirical studies such as Besley and Rosen (1998) on the taxation of gasoline and cigarettes in 
the United States find a positive relationship between local and federal taxation. Goodspeed 
(2000) in analyzing the taxation of personal income in the OCDE countries finds that when 
federal governments increase personal income taxes, subnational governments’ tax rates respond 
negatively. Boadway and Hayashi (2000) find that provincial tax rates have a negative response 
to the federal tax rate in the case of corporate tax in Canada. Esteller-Moré and Solé-Ollé (2001) 
find a positive relation between the changes in the federal rate and state rates for both the 
taxation of personal income and general sales in the United States. They find also in another 
paper (Esteller-Moré and Solé-Ollé (2002)) that the federal personal income tax rate has a 
positive effect on provincial personal income tax rates in Canada. 
 
The second important source of inefficiencies is the horizontal externality arising from tax 
competition. What would be the consequence for Quebec tax rates, for example, if tax rates 
increase in Ontario? This horizontal tax interaction also has a theoretically ambiguous effect. As 
in the case of vertical externalities, we can only determine the impact of changes in competing 
tax rates on provincial tax rates empirically. Several empirical studies find relevant interactions 
between the taxation by the same level of government. Boadway and Hayashi (2000), find that 
some provinces in Canada increase their corporate tax rates in response to increases in the tax 
rates of other provinces. Esteller-Moré and Solé-Ollé (2002) also find significant positive 
response of the provincial personal income tax rate to the personal income tax rate of competing 
provinces.  
 
The third source of tax interaction that is relevant for this paper is the institutional framework. In 
the case of Canada, equalization grants are an important issue in studying tax interaction. Smart 
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(2007) find empirically for the period of 1972-2002 that Canadian provinces increase their tax 
rates in response to more generous to equalization transfers. Higher taxes can induce distorting 
local tax bases and thus increasing federal transfers. Esteller-Moré and Solé-Ollé (2002) report 
the same result concerning personal income tax rates in Canada, that is, the fact of receiving 
equalization payments leads to higher personal income tax rates. 
  
Table 1 summarizes some of the empirical studies on the interaction between federal and local 
tax rates in the context of federal countries. 
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Table 1 - Literature Review Summary of Empirical Studies 
 
Author and Year Subject Variables Year Population Estimation 
Method 
Results 
 
A Esteller-Moré, A 
Solé-Ollé. (2002). 
Personal Income 
Taxation in Canada 
Dependent: effective provincial tax rate 
Independent: effective federal tax rate, effective 
competing provincial tax rates, equalization 
grants, and control variables( income, transfers, 
natural resources, population under 15 and over 
65, unemployment rate and political 
environment) 
1982-1996 The 10 
Canadian 
provinces (150 
observations) 
OLS   with 
fixed effects 
and 
Instrumental 
Variables. 
Evidence of tax interaction: positive 
reaction of provincial tax rates due to 
changes in federal tax rates, 
neighbouring provincial tax rates, and 
equalization grants. 
A Esteller-Moré, A 
Solé-Ollé. (2001). 
Personal Income 
Taxation in the US 
Dependent: effective provincial tax rate 
Independent: effective federal tax rate, effective 
competing state tax rates, reciprocal 
deductibility, and control variables (income, 
federal grants, population under 18 and over 65, 
political environment).  
1987-1996 41 US States 
(410 
observations) 
OLS with 
fixed effects 
and 
Instrumental 
Variables. 
Evidence of tax interaction:  positive 
reaction of state tax rates due to 
changes in federal tax rates and 
neighbouring states tax rates, and 
negative reaction of state tax rates due 
to reciprocal tax deductibility. 
Besley, T.J., 
Rosen, H.S., 1998 
Taxation of 
cigarette and 
gasoilne in the US 
(vertical 
externality) 
Dependent: state tax  rate 
Independent: federal tax rate, federal grants to 
the states, and control variables 
(macroeconomic environment – national 
unemployment rate, real GDP and state’s 
economic, demographic situation – state 
population, population density, state income, 
state unemployment rate, the proportion of 
individuals between  5 and 17,  and the 
1975-1989 Continental 
States of the 
United States 
(705 
observations) 
OLS with a 
variant of the 
robust 
standard error 
procedure of 
White and 
Instrumental 
Variables. 
Evidence of tax interaction: positive 
reaction of states tax rates due to 
changes in the federal tax rates.  
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proportion o f individuals over 65, political 
environment, and the importance of the tobacco 
and gasoline production.  
Goodspeed, T. J. 
(2000). 
Impact of  
horizontal and 
vertical 
externalities on tax 
setting by local  
governments in a 
federation (the case 
of the OCDE 
countries) 
Dependent: local income tax  rate 
Independent: national income tax rate, 
proportion of income of 20% poorest, and local 
revenue per capita. 
1975-1984 ODCE 
countries (130 
observations) 
Tobit and 
instrumental 
variables. 
Evidences of the a negative reaction 
of local tax rates due to changes in the 
national income tax rates and lower 
poverty rate. 
 
Hayashi, M. and R. 
Boadway. (2001). 
Intergovernmental 
tax interaction 
(business income 
taxes in Canada) 
Dependent: average provincial business income 
tax rates.  
Independent: average federal business income 
tax rate, equalization grants, inflation, business 
cycle (GDP growth rates), interest rates, wages, 
political party in power, public sector deficits 
1963-1996 The Federal 
Government 
and 10 
Canadian 
Provinces (340 
observations) 
IFGLS Evidences of the existence of vertical 
and horizontal externalities in the 
setting of business income taxes by 
provinces. The response of provincial 
tax rates to changes in the federal tax 
rate is negative. The horizontal 
interaction is however, found to be 
positive.  
Smart, M.  (2007) Influence of 
equalization grants 
on subnational tax 
rates 
Dependent:  effective provincial tax rates 
Independent: population-weighted average of 
the same tax rates, indicator variable for 
equalization-receiving provinces, and control 
variables (GDP per capita, percentage of 
population under 19, percentage of population 
over 64, political party) 
1972-2002 
(excluding 
1973 and 
1982) 
The 10 
Canadian 
Provinces  (190 
observations) 
OLS and 
instrumental 
variables 
Evidences of the existence of a 
positive reaction of provincial tax 
rates in the presence equalization 
grants. 
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SECTION II. – Data and Model  
 
In Canada, the main source of revenue for the federal government and provincial governments 
comes from the taxation of personal income. In 2004, 20.7% of total federal revenue came from 
the taxation of personal revenue while for provinces on average it accounted for 17.63%1 . The 
period studied is 1981-2004, constrained by the data from Table 384-0004 (CANSIM, Statistics 
Canada). We thus update the results found in other empirical studies for Canada (1982-1996). 
The model to be estimated includes variables suggested by our review of the theoretical and 
empirical studies. Thus, we estimate a model that tests the existence of vertical externalities and 
horizontal externalities, as well as the influence of the institutional framework in Canada by 
taking into account the existence of equalization grants. 
Table 2 describes all the data considered and their sources. 
 
Table 2: Data, Description, and Source 
Variable Description Source 
Effective Provincial tax rates 
(dependent) 
ratio  provincial income tax 
revenue/provincial personal income  
Table  384-0004 and table 384-0001  (CANSIM, 
Statistics Canada) 
Effective Federal tax rates 
(independent) 
Ratio federal income tax revenue 
/provincial personal income component 
Table  384-0004 and table 384-0001  (CANSIM, 
Statistics Canada) 
Equalization (independent) Dummy variable (1 if the province is a 
equalization recipient and 0 if it is not) 
Finances of the Nation: transfers payments 
(Canadian Tax Foundation) 
Per capita Personal income 
(independent) 
Per capita income Table 384-0004 and table 051-0001 (CANSIM, 
Statistics Canada) 
Per capita transfers 
(independent) 
Per capita transfers from federal 
government to provinces 
Table 384-0004 and table 051-0001 (CANSIM, 
Statistics Canada) 
% Population under 15 
(independent) 
Percentage of the population under 15 
years old in the province 
Table 051-0001 (CANSIM, Statistics Canada) 
% Population over 65 
(independent) 
Percentage of the population under 65 
years old in the province 
Table 051-0001 (CANSIM, Statistics Canada) 
Unemployment rate 
(independent) 
Percentage of the labour force 
unemployed 
Table  282-0002 (CANSIM, Statistics Canada) 
 
                                                 
1 Source : CANSIM – table 385-0001 (total revenue and personal income taxes)  
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2.1 Effective Provincial Personal Income Tax Rates 
 
The provincial tax rates are the dependent variable, as we study the reactions of provinces to 
changes in the federal tax rates and other provinces tax rates. The effective provincial tax rate is 
defined as the ratio of total provincial income tax received and the total provincial personal 
income (see Table 2). This gives an average tax rate, which is also used in Goodspeed (2000) and 
Hayashi and Boadway (2001). The effective tax rate is used as the statutory tax rates personal 
income in Canada are progressive and thus single marginal tax cannot be taken as representative 
for all (Esteller-Moré and Solé-Ollé, 2002) households. Another reason pointed by Esteller-Moré 
and Solé-Ollé (2002) is that “averages rates are often employed to represent interjurisdictional 
differences in taxation” (p.18). Finally, the adoption of a provincial tax-on-income ( taxes levied 
based on federally-defined taxable income) structure for individuals replacing the tax-on-tax 
(taxes levied as a percentage of federal income tax) by nine of the ten provinces (Quebec already 
used this approach) in 2000 and 2001 makes more difficult the analysis of the changes in 
statutory tax rates. Nova-Scotia, New Brunswick, Ontario, Manitoba, and British Columbia 
adopted the change in 2001, while Newfoundland, Prince Edward Island, Saskatchewan, and 
Alberta implemented the tax-on-income structure in 2001.2 Thus, to test the possible interactions 
that may exist between federal and provincial taxation, effective rates are used instead of 
statutory rates3. Figure 1 and 2 show us the evolution of the effective provincial tax rates. 
                                                 
2 Finances of the Nation, 2000.  Provincial Budgetary Position, section 2:5. 
3 Quebec provincial tax rate are multiplied by 83,5% as there is an abatement under the federal-provincial fiscal 
arrangement, in place of direct cost-sharing by the federal government. (available at www.cra.gc.ca) 
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Figure 1 - Effective Provincial Personal Income Tax Rates - Eastern 
Canadian Provinces (1981-2004)
4,00%
6,00%
8,00%
10,00%
12,00%
Year 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
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Source: Statistics Canada, CANSIM, Provincial economic accounts 
Figure 2 - Effective Provincial Personal Income Tax Rates - Western 
Canadian Provinces (1981-2004)
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Source: Statistics Canada, CANSIM, Provincial economic accounts 
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Although the province of Quebec has an abatement provided under the federal-provincial 
arrangement of 16.5% that is corrected for calculating its provincial income tax, its tax rates are 
the highest for all the periods considered. This difference may exist as a consequence of different 
laws concerning the taxation of personal income in Quebec and the federal government, while 
the other provinces follow the same rules as the federal government in defining taxable income. 
The lowest personal income tax rate is the one from Alberta, for all the period considered. The 
periods of 1985-1987 and 1993-1997 show a trend of increasing tax rates for all provinces.  
 
It should be noted that from 1999, most provinces had a decrease in their tax rates, except for 
Nova Scotia, Quebec, and Manitoba. In 2000, this decrease continues and more intensely, with 
the exception of Ontario. This year, as shown in the publication ‘Finances of the Nation’, all 
provinces had cut personal income tax rates, as a consequence of changes in the tax structure. 
During this year, all provinces announced their adoption of a provincial tax-on-income structure 
for individuals in either 2000 or 2001(Quebec already used this system). 
 
2.2 Effective Federal Personal Income Tax Rates 
 
The second variable used is the independent variable federal tax rate. This variable will be 
important in analysing vertical externalities. For the same reason aforementioned for the 
provincial tax rates, here we use the effective federal tax rate, defined as the ratio of total federal 
income tax received and the total federal personal income.  Figure 3 and 4 below show its 
evolution. 
 15
Figure 3 - Effective Federal Personal Income Tax Rates - Eastern 
Canadian Provinces(1981-2004)
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Source: Statistics Canada, CANSIM, Provincial economic accounts 
Figure 4 - Effective Federal Personal Income Tax Rates -Western 
Canadian Provinces(1981-2004)
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Source: Statistics Canada, CANSIM, Provincial economic accounts 
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The province of Ontario has, for the period considered, maintained itself as the province with the 
highest federal tax rate, while Quebec has the lowest federal personal income tax rate for the 
same period. The difference between the lowest and the highest tax rate is not higher than 
3.8%.Ontario has a higher average tax rate since it has a higher per capita income. Combining 
this with the progressive taxation of income yields the higher average effective personal income 
tax rates for Ontario. 
 
According to Wilson and Dungan (1992), the budget of 1983 was an attempt to combine near-
term stimulus with tax structure changes in order to stimulate investments and reduce the deficit. 
So in the short term, the consequence was a decrease in federal tax rates until 1984 with 
subsequent increases in tax rates until 1987. Also, as described in the section ‘Federal Budgetary 
Outlook’ of the publication Finances of the Nations, the government had, in 1985, two main 
concerns, unemployment and deficit. The second goal was met trough expenditures reductions 
and tax increases. Federal income tax was subject to a temporary surtax during 1985 and to both 
a temporary and a general surtax in 1986, explaining the fast increase of federal tax rates in these 
two years. 
 
One can also notice that starting from 2000 until 2003, there is a decrease in the federal tax rates. 
As mentioned in the publication ‘Finances of the Nation’, “Individual taxpayers received some 
tax relief in this year’s budget because of the minister’s announcement of the resumption of full 
indexation of the federal system, effective for the 2000 and subsequent taxation years”. The 
impacts of tax reduction became apparent in 2000 as is reported by the Department of Finance 
using the following measures: full indexation of the personal income tax system, reduction of the 
middle tax rate from 26% to 24%, elimination of 5% deficit reduction surtax on incomes up to 
about $85,000 and reduced for all others, and the increase of the maximum annual payments 
under the Canada Child Tax Benefit.4 
 
2.3 Competing Provincial Effective Personal Income Tax Rates (horizontal externality) 
 
                                                 
4Budget Info, Department of Finance, Canada. Access at:  http://www.fin.gc.ca/toce/2000/jul-e.html 
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‘Competing provincial effective personal income tax rates’ is also used as an independent 
variable in the calculation of the competing tax rates, as one of the aims of this research is to 
evaluate if the personal income tax rates of competing provinces have influence the provincial 
tax rate (horizontal externality). To calculate the competing tax rate, we have to find a criterion 
on how provinces may affect one another, that is, a measure that represents the possible 
movement of personal income tax bases between provinces. Two methods were used, one based 
on the importance of the GDP of each province and another based on the distance and 
population. The first one is measured taking, for example, for the province i, all other provincial 
tax rates multiplied by the weight of each GDP in the national GDP.5 
 
( )∑ ∑≠ ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛×=
ji J
j
ji PIB
PIBtt  
 
The evolution of the competing tax rates using this criterion is reported in Figure 5 and 6 that 
follows: 
Figure 5: Competing Effective Personal Income Tax Rates- GDP weighted 
measure - Eastern Canadian Provinces (1981-2004)
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Source: Statistics Canada, CANSIM, Provincial economic accounts 
 
                                                 
5 This variable will be referred as competing tax rate 1. 
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Figure 6: Competing Effective  Personal Income Tax Rates- GDP weighted 
measure- Western Canadian Provinces (1981-2004)
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Source: Statistics Canada, CANSIM, Provincial economic accounts 
 
The second method for calculating the competing tax rates is the same as used by Esteller-Moré 
and Solé-Ollé (2002). They take contiguous provinces as being possible sources of immigration 
and migration and then weigh provincial tax rates by population and inverse distance between the 
main provincial centres (cities with biggest population in each province). This gives us the 
weight (Νij ) for each province defined as6: 
Νij = ( )∑ww ijij  ; where wij  = d nc ij jij
×
, and 
 
cij  = 1 if provinces i and j are contiguous. 
nj  = population of province j. 
dij  = distance in kilometres between the main population centre of provinces i and j.  
 
 
                                                 
6 This variable will be referred as competing tax rate 2. 
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The evolution of the competing tax rates is shown in figure 7 and 8. 
Figure 7: Competing Effective Personal Income Tax Rates- neighbouring 
provinces measure - Eastern Canadian Provinces (1981-2004)
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Source: Statistics Canada, CANSIM, Provincial economic accounts 
Figure 8: Competing Effective Personal Income Tax Rates- neighbouring 
provinces measure  - Western Canadian Provinces (1981-2004)
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Source: Statistics Canada, CANSIM, Provincial economic accounts 
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The evolution of the competing tax rates shows us that the province of Ontario had the highest 
competing tax rates for the period considered. The reason for this is that Ontario is contiguous to 
the provinces of Quebec and Manitoba. As mentioned before, the province of Quebec has the 
highest provincial tax rates and thus influencing the calculation of its weight in contiguous 
provinces such as Ontario.   
 
2.4 Equalization Grants 
 
According to MacNevin (2004), the formal Canadian equalization system has its origin in 1957 
and it is renewed every five years. Changes have occurred since then, but the most important one 
comes with the Constitutional Act. In 1982 the equalization was incorporated in the constitution, 
the five province standards for equalization was adopted, and a ceiling and floor were established 
for equalization entitlements. As also pointed by MacNevin (2004), “The equalization program 
is the principal means of achieving horizontal fiscal balance within the Canadian federation; 
horizontal balance in this context relates to the distribution of fiscal resources among the 
provinces. This role makes equalization a key element in Canada’s system of federal-provincial 
fiscal arrangements” (p.1). The formula for the calculation of equalization payments is set by 
federal legislation and depends on the fiscal capacity of each province evaluated with respect to 
an established standard. That way, provinces that do not meet the standard are eligible for 
equalization payments. Provincial fiscal capacity is assessed with the national average rate for 
each tax described in the ‘representative revenue system’ applied to the province’s estimated 
base for each tax. (MacNevin, 2004)  
 
As described by Smart (1998), equalization may have a positive impact on provincial tax rates as 
it may reduce the marginal cost of public goods. In order to capture the influence of the variable 
equalization we use a dummy variable: 1 if the province received equalization grants and 0 if the 
province did not received equalization grants in a given year.7 For the period considered, the 
province of Alberta was never a recipient of equalization grants, neither was Ontario. The 
                                                 
7 Canadian Tax Foundation, Finances of the Nation Publication: Estimate of Equalization: Equalization Entitlement 
by Revenue Source and Province (1981-2004). 
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province of British Columbia was not a recipient until 2001 and the province of Saskatchewan 
was not a recipient for the period of 1982-1985. All other provinces were recipients of 
equalization grants during all the periods considered. 
 
2.5 Control Variables 
 
To account for the fact that the level of provincial income tax rates may also be affected by 
economic and social factors, we include control variables: personal income per capita8, transfers 
per capita to the provinces9, percentage of population over 65 years old10, percentage of 
population under 15 years old11, and unemployment rate12  
 
2.5.1 Per capita income 
 
The effect of a change in the per capita income on personal income tax rates is ambiguous. More 
personal income means more revenue for the government with the same tax rates, so it is not 
possible to determine the effect of the changes in income per capita in tax rates. Per capita 
income has trend of increase (in nominal terms) for all provinces. The province of Alberta 
presented the highest income per capita among all provinces and had remarkable growth starting 
in 1999. The province with the lowest income per capita is Newfoundland and Labrador, 
although this province also had increases in income per capita. 
 
2.5.2 Per capita transfers 
 
The provinces of Newfoundland and Labrador and Prince Edward Island received the most 
federal transfers per capita during the period studied. The provinces of Ontario, British 
Columbia, and Alberta received the least federal transfers. As the revenue of provinces increase 
as transfers increase, one might expect that the effect of the transfers per capita on provincial tax 
rates is expected to be negative.  
                                                 
8 Statistics Canada CANSIM Table 384-0001 and CANSIM Table 051-0001. 
9 Statistics Canada CANSIM Table 385-0002. 
10 Statistics Canada, CANSIM, Table 051-0001. 
11 Idem. 
12 Statistics Canada, CANSIM, Table  282-0002. 
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Combining the analysis of the income per capita with transfers per capita, it is possible to 
conclude that the richest provinces, the ones with higher income per capita were the ones that 
received the lowest federal transfers.  
 
2.5.3 Percentage of population over 65 years old, percentage of population under 15 years 
old, and unemployment rate 
 
These three control variables account for the possibility that “populations with higher shares of 
potential users of public services and/or higher cost of delivering those services will need higher 
levels of expenditure and, therefore, will be burdened more heavily through income taxes” (A 
Esteller-Moré, A Solé-Ollé., 2002, p.22). The percentage of the population over 65 years tends to 
increase in the period of study, while the percentage of the population under 15 tends to decrease. 
The unemployment rate is instable and oscillates between periods of increase and decrease.  
 
The model to be estimated will be: 
 
μλπδβα itlijl lijijijiij ZeqnTt +++++= ∑ ***  
 
Where:  
i = province 
j = time 
tit  = provincial tax rates 
T it = federal tax rates 
nit  = competing tax rates 
eqit  = dummy variable for recipient of equalization grants 
Z litl l∑ *λ  = vector of control variables including: personal income per capita, total transfers 
per capita, population over 65 years old, population under 15 years old, unemployment rate. 
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Table 3 summarizes the data. 
Table 3: Summary Statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
provincial tax rates 0.068286 0.013125 0.0401511 0.1030495 
federal tax rates 0.110976 0.0156953 0.0746782 0.151265 
competing tax rates crit.1 .0696706 .0079663 .0467691 .0845138 
competing tax rates crit. 2 .0686244 .0116808 .0401511 .0981216 
personal income per capita 15281.95 4800.343 5834.768 33021.38 
transfers per capita 1489.001 781.7749 360.4458 3867.576 
% population over 65  0.2236046 0.0236944 0.1735894 0.3155339 
% population under 15 0.1158585 0.0182454 0.0715961 0.1486109 
unemployment rate 0.1048583 0.0373666 0.039 0.202 
N=240 
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SECTION III.- Econometric Issues and Results 
 
3.1 Unit root and cointegration tests 
 
The estimation of a pooling cross-section time series data model data gives us some 
econometrics issues related to time series econometrics. As the data used is composed of ten 
provinces and 24 years, non-stationary series may exist and thus affecting the estimation of the 
model. This non-stationarity can lead us to a spurious regression, whereby two time series 
appears to be related when they are not.  The two unit root tests used are the ones based on the 
methods described by Levin, Lin and Chu (2000) and Im et al. (2003) (to simplify the notation, 
the Levin, Lin and Chu test and Im et al test will be called LL and IPS respectively.) RATS 
(Regression Analysis of Time Series) version 7.0 is the software used for the tests mentioned and 
for the cointegration test that will be described later. The LL test “allows for individual-specific 
intercepts and time trends. Moreover, the error variance and the pattern of higher-order serial 
correlation are also permitted to vary freely across individuals” (p.3). The LL test is relevant for 
panels of moderate size, between 10 and 250 individuals and 25-250 time series observations per 
individual. Levin, Lin and Chu (2000) also point out that “the power of the panel-based unit root 
test is dramatically higher, compared to performing a separate unit root test for each individual 
time series” (p.1). In addition, panel unit root tests have normal distributions in contrast to 
individual unit root test. 
 
The null hypothesis of both tests is that each province has a non-stationnary time series versus 
the alternative hypothesis that all individual time series are stationary. Thus, if the null 
hypothesis can be rejected, there is evidence that the variable tested is stationary.  The two LL 
statistics used are the t-rho statistics and the ADF (augmented Dickey-Fuller) test. The IPS test is 
based on the averaged augmented Dickey-Fuller statistics computed for each series in the panel, 
and it is referred by Im et al. (2003) as t-bar test. It is important to mention that for both the LL 
test and the IPS test, the hypothesis of independence among provinces is necessary (provinces do 
not present contemporaneous correlations).  
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The main difference between the LL and IPS tests is that while in the LL test the alternative 
hypothesis supposes that each series has identical first order autoregressive coefficient, in the IPS 
test, these first order autoregressive coefficients are allowed to vary among variables. 
 
The tests were made with a choice of trend for each variable. For some variables, it was difficult 
to establish if the series had a trend, so the approach adopted was to test both with and without a 
trend. Also, as time dummies are allowed when computing theses tests on RATS, they were used 
in order to reduce the possible cross-sectional correlation in the errors.  
  
Table 4 reports the results for the LL test and IPS test for the variables considered in the model 
described in the last section.  
 
Table 4:  Unit Root Tests 
Results (level form)  LL IPS 
Variables Trend t-rho ADF ADF 
PROVRATE no/yes 
Does not reject H0 at 5% 
/Does not reject H0 at 5% 
Does not reject H0 at 5% 
/Does not reject H0 at 5 % 
Does not reject H0 at 5% 
/Does not reject H0 at 5% 
FEDRATE no/yes 
Does not reject H0 at 5% 
/Does not reject H0 at 5% 
Does not reject H0 at 5% 
/Does not reject H0 at 5% 
Rejects H0 at 5%/Does not 
reject H0 
COMPRATE1 no/yes 
Does not reject H0/Does not 
reject H0 
Does not reject H0/Does 
not reject H0 
Does not reject H0/Does 
not reject H0 
COMPRATE2 no/yes 
Does not reject H0/Does not 
reject H0 
Does not reject H0/Does 
not reject H0 
Does not reject H0/ rejects 
H0 at 5% 
IPC yes Does not reject H0 at 5% Does not reject H0 at 5% Does not reject H0 at 5% 
TPC no/yes 
Does not reject H0 at 5% 
/rejects H0 at 5% 
Does not reject H0 at 5% 
/rejects H0 at 5% 
Does not reject H0 at 5% 
/rejects H0 at 5% 
POPU15 yes Does not reject H0 at 5% Does not reject H0 at 5% Does not reject H0 at 5% 
POPO65 yes Does not reject H0 at 5% Does not reject H0 at 5% Does not reject H0 at 5% 
UNMPRATE no Rejects H0 at 5% Rejects H0 at 5% Rejects H0 at 5% 
HO : unit root 
 
There is evidence that the dependent variable provincial tax rates is non-stationary, the null 
hypothesis cannot be rejected in the presence or not of a trend. The null hypothesis cannot be 
rejected for the federal tax rates or the competing tax rates. For the control variables, there is 
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evidence that the percentages of the population under 15 and over 65, the income per capita, and 
transfers per capita are non-stationary. However, as expected, the variable unemployment rate is 
stationary.  
 
To correct this problem, one solution is to reconstruct the variables transforming them to obtain a 
stationary process. Two alternatives were tested in order to verify if the series could be 
transformed into a stationary process: the logarithmic form and the first difference. However, 
these transformations have also to be tested, as they will not necessarily lead the variables to 
become stationary. The results from the LL and IPS test for variables in their logarithmic and 
first difference forms are reported in tables 5 and 6. 
 
Table 5:  Unit Root Tests 
Results (logarithmic form) LL IPS 
Variables Trend t-rho ADF ADF 
PROVRATE yes Rejects H0 at 10% Rejects H0 at 10% Rejects H0 at 10% 
FEDRATE yes Rejects H0 at 5% Rejects H0 at 10% Rejects H0 at 5% 
COMPRATE1 no Rejects H0 at 5% Rejects H0 at 5% Rejects H0 at 5% 
COMPRATE2 no Does not reject H0 Rejects H0 at 10% Rejects H0 at 5% 
IPC yes Does not reject H0 at 5% Does not reject H0 at 5% Does not reject H0 at 5% 
TPC no/yes 
Does not reject H0 at 5% 
/rejects H0 at 10% 
Does not reject H0 at 5% 
/rejects H0 at 10% 
Does not reject H0 at 5% 
/rejects H0 at 10% 
POPU15 yes Does not reject H0 at 5% Does not reject H0 at 5% Does not reject H0 at 5% 
POPO65 yes Does not reject H0 at 5% Does not reject H0 at 5% Does not reject H0 at 5% 
UNMPRATE no Rejects H0 at 5% Rejects H0 at 5% Rejects H0 at 5% 
H0: unit root 
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Table 6:  Unit Root Tests 
Results (first difference form) LL IPS 
Variables Trend t-rho ADF ADF 
PROVRATE no/yes 
Rejects H0 at 5%/Rejects 
H0 at 5% 
Rejects H0 at 5%/Rejects 
H0 at 5% 
Rejects H0 at 5%/Rejects 
H0 at 5% 
FEDRATE no/yes 
Rejects H0 at 5%/Rejects 
H0 at 5% 
Rejects H0 at 5%/Rejects 
H0 at 5% 
Rejects H0 at 5%/Rejects 
H0 at 5% 
COMPRATE1 no/yes 
Rejects H0 at 5%/Rejects 
H0 at 5% 
Rejects H0 at 5%/Rejects 
H0 at 5% 
Rejects H0 at 5%/Rejects 
H0 at 5% 
COMPRATE2 no/yes 
Rejects H0 at 5%/Rejects 
H0 at 5% 
Rejects H0 at 5%/Rejects 
H0 at 5% 
Rejects H0 at 5%/Rejects 
H0 at 5% 
IPC yes Rejects H0 at 5% Rejects H0 at 5% Rejects H0 at 5% 
TPC no/yes 
Rejects H0 at 5%/Rejects 
H0 at 5% 
Rejects H0 at 5%/Rejects 
H0 at 5% 
Rejects H0 at 5%/Rejects 
H0 at 5% 
POPU15 yes Rejects H0 at 5% Rejects H0 at 5% Rejects H0 at 5% 
POPO65 yes Rejects H0 at 5% Rejects H0 at 5% Rejects H0 at 5% 
UNMPRATE no Rejects H0 at 5% Rejects H0 at 5% Rejects H0 at 5% 
H0: unit root 
 
When taken in the logarithmic form, we can reject the hypothesis of unit root for the provincial 
tax rate, for the federal tax rate, the unemployment rate, and the transfers per capita. The results 
of the unit root tests are as expected; the null hypothesis of unit root can be rejected for all 
variables in their first difference.  
 
A linear combination of non-stationary variables can be stationary and thus lead to spurious 
regression. “In the conventional time series case, cointegration refers to the idea that for a set of 
variables that are individually integrated of order one, some linear combination of these 
variables can be described as stationary” (Pedroni, 1999, p.655). As we found evidence of the 
majority of the variables being non-stationary, in the level form, it is useful to test for 
cointegration in order to estimate an alternative model. To test for the cointegration, the test 
developed by Pedroni (2004) was used.  The null hypothesis of this test is no cointegration in 
dynamic panels with multiple regressors. According to Pedroni (2004), “an important feature of 
these tests is that they allow not only the dynamics and fixed effects to differ across members of 
the panel, but also that they allow the cointegrating vector to differ across members under the 
alternative hypothesis”.  The methodology developed by Pedroni (1999), gives us seven different 
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statistics: four are based on pooling along the within-dimension (referred as panel cointegration 
statistics) and three based on pooling along between-dimension (referred as group mean panel 
cointegration statistics). The first panel cointegration statistics is a type of non-parametric 
variance ratio statistic. The second is a panel version of a non-parametric statistic that is 
analogous to the Phillips and Perron rho-statistic. The third statistic is also non-parametric and is 
analogous to the Phillips and Perron t-statistic. Finally, the fourth of the simple panel 
cointegration statistics is a parametric statistic which is analogous to the augmented Dickey 
Fuller t-statistic. Concerning the group mean statistics, the first is analogous to the Phillips and 
Perron rho-statistic, the second is analogous to the Phillips and Perron t-statistic and the last one 
augmented Dickey-Fuller t-statistic (Pedroni, 2004). It is important to mention that “the between-
dimension-based statistics allow one to model an additional source of potential heterogeneity 
across individual members of the panel”. (Pedroni, 1999, p.658) This is a consequence of the 
test’s construction: the between-dimension statistics allows for different autoregressive 
coefficients of the estimated residuals under the alternative hypothesis across different members. 
According to him, “Just as in the conventional time series case, each of these statistics is shown 
to have a comparative advantage in terms of small sample size and power properties depending 
on the underlying data-generating process”. (Pedroni, 1999, p.658) 
 
The cointegration relationship is tested taking all non-stationary variables and tests for 
cointegration. If the null hypothesis can be rejected, one variable is removed and then the test is 
rerun. The tests were made using a trend and time dummies. The results from the cointegration 
test for the level form of the variables are showed in the tables 7 and 8. 
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Table 7: Cointegration Tests Results (with competing tax rates criterion 1) 
Variables Rejects H0 at 5% Does not reject H0  
PROVRATE FEDRATE 
COMPRATE1 IPC TPC 
POPU15 POPO65 
panel pp-stat; panel adf-stat;group pp-
stat;group adf-stat;panel rho-stat;group rho-
stat panel v-stat 
PROVRATE FEDRATE 
COMPRATE1 IPC TPC 
POPU15 
panel rho-stat; panel pp-stat; panel adf-stat; 
group pp-stat; group adf-stat; group rho-stat panel v-stat 
PROVRATE FEDRATE 
COMPRATE1 IPC TPC  panel rho-stat; group rho-stat 
panel v-stat;panel pp-stat; panel adf-
stat; group pp-stat; group adf-stat; 
PROVRATE FEDRATE 
COMPRATE1 IPC panel rho-stat 
panel v-stat;panel pp-stat; panel adf-
stat; group rho-stat; group pp-stat; 
group adf-stat; 
HO: no cointegration 
 
Table 8: Cointegration Tests Results (with competing tax rates criterion 2) 
Variables Rejects H0 at 5% Does not reject H0 
PROVRATE FEDRATE 
COMPRATE2 IPC TPC 
POPU15 POPO65 
panel pp-stat; panel adf-stat;group pp-
stat;group adf-stat;panel rho-stat;group rho-
stat panel v-stat 
PROVRATE FEDRATE 
COMPRATE2 IPC TPC 
POPU15 
panel pp-stat; panel adf-stat; group pp-stat; 
group adf-stat; group rho-stat panel v-stat; panel rho-stat 
PROVRATE FEDRATE 
COMPRATE2 IPC TPC  
panel adf-stat; group pp-stat; group adf-stat; 
panel rho-stat; panel pp-stat panel v-stat; 
PROVRATE FEDRATE 
COMPRATE2 IPC 
panel pp-stat; panel adf-stat; group pp-stat; 
group adf-stat; group rho-stat panel v-stat; panel rho-stat 
PROVRATE FEDRATE 
COMPRATE2  
panel pp-stat; panel adf-stat; group pp-stat; 
group adf-stat  
panel v-stat; panel rho-stat; group 
rho-stat 
PROVRATE FEDRATE  panel pp-stat; panel adf-stat 
panel v-stat; panel rho-stat; group 
rho-stat; group pp-stat; group adf-
stat  
H0: no cointegration 
 
When using the criterion 1 for the competing tax rates, we find evidence of cointegration 
between the variables provincial tax rate, federal tax rate, competing tax rate, income per capita, 
transfers per capita, and population under 15. When considering the second criterion for the 
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competing tax rate, we also have evidence that all variables may have a linear combination that 
can be stationary, and thus lead to a spurious regression.  
 
3.2 Fixed vs. Random effects model, heteroskedasticity, contemporaneous and serial 
correlation test 
 
As a consequence of the results of the tests obtained in the last section, three models were 
estimated in to order to empirically determine the existence of vertical and horizontal 
externalities in the taxation of personal income in Canada. The first result that will be used is that 
all variables with exception of unemployment rate are non-stationary.  Thus, the first model to be 
estimated will take all variables in their first differences, as this transforms them into stationary 
series process. The second model estimated takes the variables in their logarithmic form. The 
third model takes in consideration the cointegration between variables in their level form.  
 
In this section we report the results of some test related to heteroskedasticity, contemporaneous 
and serial correlation to better adjust our estimations.13 Also, we report the Hausman tests done 
in order to decide between using fixed or random effects model. 14 Under the null hypothesis 
(difference in the coefficients are not systematic), we can conclude from the Hausman test that 
we have to use a fixed-effects model. For the heteroskedasticity test, a Breusch- Pagan test was 
used. The first step of this test is to estimate the model and then regress the square of the 
residuals on the independent variables. If we can reject the null hypothesis, we conclude the 
existence of heteroskedasticity. We also try to detect the type of heteroskedasticity using the 
xttest3 test in STATA. If we can reject the null hypothesis we conclude that there is inter-
individual heteroskedasticity. 
 
We can detect contemporaneous correlation by using a Breusch-Pagan test (in STATA this test is 
made by the command xttest2). The null hypothesis is residual independence between provinces. 
We also tested for intra-individual first order auto-correlation (Wooldridge test with the 
command xtserial in STATA).  
 
                                                 
13 All tests reported in this section were made using STATA 10.0. 
14 The conclusions of the tests are based on statistical significance of 0.05. 
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The results of the aforementioned test are reported in tables 9 and 10, according to the use of the 
different criteria for the calculation of the competing tax rates. 
Level form First Difference form Logarithmic form Table 9: Tests 
(competing tax rate 1) Result Conclusion Result Conclusion Result Conclusion 
Hausman test (fixed vs 
random effects) 
Rejects 
H0 at 5% Fixed effects model 
Does not 
reject H0 
random effects 
model 
Rejects H0 
at 5% Fixed effects model
Breusch-Pagan test for 
Heteroskedasticity          
H0: homoscedasticity 
Rejects 
H0 at 5% Heteroskedasticity  
Rejects H0 
at 5% Heteroskedasticity  
Rejects H0 
at 5% Heteroskedasticity  
 
inter-individual 
heteroskedasticity 
H0:homoscedasticity 
inter-individual 
Rejects 
H0 at 5% 
inter-individual 
heteroskedasticity 
Rejects H0 
at 5% 
inter-individual 
heteroskedasticity 
Rejects H0 
at 5% 
inter-individual 
heteroskedasticity 
Contemporaneous 
correlation test 
(Breusch-Pagan)             
H0: no cross-sectional 
correlation 
Rejects 
H0 at 5% 
Cross-sectional 
correlation 
Rejects H0 
at 5% 
Cross-sectional 
correlation 
Rejects H0 
at 5% 
Cross-sectional 
correlation 
Serial correlation test 
(Wooldridge test)            
H0: no first-order 
correlation 
Rejects 
H0 at 5% Serial correlation 
Does not 
reject H0 No serial correlation 
Rejects H0 
at 5% Serial correlation 
 
Level form First Difference form Logarithmic form Table 10: Tests 
(competing tax rate 2) Result Conclusion Result Conclusion Result Conclusion 
Hausman test (fixed vs 
random effects) 
Rejects at 
5% 
Fixed-effects 
model 
Does not 
reject H0 random effects model 
Rejects H0 
at 5% Fixed effects model
Breusch-Pagan test for 
Heteroskedasticity          
H0: homoscedasticity 
Rejects 
H0 at 5% Heteroskedasticity 
Rejects H0 
at 5% Heteroskedasticity  
Rejects H0 
at 5% Heteroskedasticity 
 
inter-individual 
heteroskedasticity 
H0:homoscedasticity 
inter-individual 
Rejects 
H0 at 5% 
inter-individual 
heteroskedasticity 
Rejects H0 
at 5% 
inter-individual 
heteroskedasticity 
Rejects H0 
at 5% 
inter-individual 
heteroskedasticity 
Contemporaneous 
correlation test 
(Breusch-Pagan)             
H0: no cross-sectional 
correlation 
Rejects 
H0 at 5% 
Cross-sectional 
correlation 
Rejects H0 
at 5% 
Cross-sectional 
correlation 
Rejects H0 
at 5% 
Cross-sectional 
correlation 
Serial correlation test 
(Wooldridge test)            
H0: no first-order 
correlation 
Rejects 
H0 at 5% Serial correlation 
Does not 
reject H0 No serial correlation 
Rejects H0 
at 5% Serial correlation 
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The tests results are basically the same when using different criteria for the competing tax rates. 
The Hausman test allows deciding for a random effects model in the case where the variables are 
in their first difference form and for a fixed effects model where the variables are in the level 
form and in the logarithmic form. The two heteroskedasticity tests have for all cases the same 
result: we reject the null hypothesis and thus we should consider the existence of 
heteroskedasticity in our estimations. To correct for these potential problems, we use a Feasible 
Generalized Least Squares (FGLS) method for our regressions 
 
3.3 Endogeneity 
 
Another consideration in estimating the first difference form and the logarithmic form is the 
possible endogeneity of federal tax rates and competing tax rates. To deal with this problem we 
use these variables lagged by one period as an instrument (they are correlated with the 
contemporaneous value of the tax rates thus eliminating the correlation between the variables and 
the residuals of the original regression) and do the estimation in a two-stage instrumental 
variables method. Two tests were used to conclude whether or not we should use instrumental 
variables: the Hausman test and the Nakamura-Nakamura test.  The null hypothesis of the 
Hausman test is that the difference between the two models estimated is not significant. 
Therefore, if we cannot reject the null hypothesis we can continue to estimate our model without 
instrumental variables. The Nakamura-Nakamura test is done in two steps: the first by regressing 
each endogenous variable on the instrumental variables and exogenous variables. The residuals 
of this estimation are now included in the original regression and if their coefficients are 
significant, we cannot reject the hypothesis of endogeneity of the variables tested. We tested 
three cases for each criterion for the calculation of the competing tax rates: one with the 
competing tax rate lagged in one period, the other with the federal tax rate lagged in one period, 
and finally one with both instruments. These tests were made for the case of the first difference 
and logarithmic models. In the case of the first difference model, the null hypothesis of the 
Hausman test could not be rejected and the coefficients of the residuals of the Nakamura-
Nakamura test were not significant. Thus, we conclude that we did not have to use the potential 
instruments. In the case of the variables in the logarithmic form, we achieve the same results, 
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except in the case of the variable one period lagged competing tax rate with the second criteria 
for the Hausman test, where we can reject the null hypothesis. But as the Nakamura-Nakamura 
test gave us the contrary result, we conclude that we should not use the potential instruments. 
 
3.4 Regression Results 
 
In light of the test results described in the last section, the three models that were estimated were 
a first difference model and the logarithmic model, using a Feasible Generalized Least Square 
method), and a DOLS (Dynamic Ordinary Least Square Method), also using a Feasible 
Generalized Least Square Method. The DOLS approach to estimate the model takes into account 
the cointegration results reported. The DOLS method was developed by Saikonen (1991). Using 
this method we do not have to take into account the problem of endogeneity, as asymptotically it 
has no effect on the robustness of the estimates. This method uses the leads and lags of the first 
difference of the variables that are non-stationary. Our choice of the numbers of leads and lags 
used here was one, due to our relatively small time sample. Table 11 reports the regression 
results obtained with the two different criteria used for the calculation of the competing tax rates 
and with the three different methods of estimation. 
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Note: *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels respectively 
 
                  
                  
Table 11 : Regression Results   
Variables Logarithmic form First difference form Level form (1 lead and 1 lag of the first difference) 
 GLS (z-statistic) GLS (z-statistic) GLS (z-statistic) GLS (z-statistic) DOLS (z-statistic) DOLS (z-statistic) 
       
federal tax rate 0 .4421817***  0.2434435*** 0.3095766*** 0.1672079***  0.0975941  -0.0675773 
 (6.71) (4.42) (8.53) (5.80) (1.33)  (-1.17) 
competing tax rate 1  0.4172482*** -  0.4226955*** -  0.3279215*** - 
  (6.55)   (6.13)    (2.96)   
competing tax rate 2 - 0.6501608*** - 0.7030242***   0.5178079*** 
   (13.77)   (16.22)   (8.33) 
equalization  0.0199227  0.0082379   0.000459 0.0003794  0.0025483  0.0035392** 
  (0.92)  (0.48) (1.17) (1.08) (1.49) (2.27) 
population under 15  -0.4990227***  -0.3753838***  0.0023296    0.019554   -0.1565834***   -0.1718977*** 
  (-3.80)  (-3.54)  (0.03) (0.30)  (-3.24)  (-4.74) 
population over 65  0.3054595*** 0.3571706*** 0.1015282  0.0157668  0.181354***  0.1945079*** 
 (4.34) (5.26) (0.71) (0.12) (3.74) (4.19) 
transfers per capita 0.0092915  -0.0001826  -5.70e-07 5.19e-07 1.75e-06  -1.71e-06**   
  (0.49)  -(0.01) (-0.73) (0.82) (1.48)  (-2.05) 
income per capita  -0.1699692*** -0.1809006***  -1.40e-06*** -1.10e-06*** -3.99e-07  -4.41e-07* 
  (-3.09)  -3.66  (-4.41) (-3.71) (-1.56)  (-1.95) 
unemployment rate 0.0324608  0.0147373  0.0005123  0.0018822 0.004291  0.0199883  
 (1.24) (0.60) (0.03) (0.14)  (0.22)  (1.11) 
constant 0.9382358 1.57099*** 0.0005149   0.0004083 0.0531483***  0.0637518*** 
 (1.49)  (2.75) (1.03) (0.95) (2.95) (3.97) 
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The three different estimations give us more confidence regarding the existence of vertical and 
horizontal externalities and the impact of if equalization grants on the provincial tax rates. The 
logarithmic model makes our interpretations easier, as the coefficients are elasticities. The first 
difference model is harder to interpret though, as we have to consider how the temporal change 
in the independent variable influences the same kind of change in the dependent variable. But 
this does not prevent us from at least achieving some conclusions about what kind of reaction the 
provinces have given changes in the federal tax rate and other provincial tax rates. The DOLS 
method is certainly the easiest model to interpret as we take the variables in their level form. 
 
3.4.1 Vertical Tax Interaction and Vertical Externalities 
 
The three different estimations of the impact of the federal tax rate on the provincial tax rate 
show evidence of the existence of vertical externalities. The estimation of our model in the 
logarithmic form and in the first difference form allows us to conclude that the provinces have a 
positive reaction to the federal tax rate, regardless of the method of calculation of the competing 
tax rates. But the impact is slightly different: using the competing tax rate 1, the magnitude of the 
impact is smaller than the one obtained from the competing tax rate 2.  However, using the 
DOLS method, the conclusion is not the same and even ambiguous. The two different ways of 
calculating the competing tax rates show us different signs for the federal tax rate, and we cannot 
make any conclusions as the coefficients are not significant.  
 
The positive sign of the federal tax rate is similar with the empirical results found in other studies 
of taxation of personal income. Both Esteller-Moré and Solé-Ollé (2001) and Esteller-Moré and 
Solé-Ollé (2002) found this result for the United States and Canada. The result is, however, the 
opposite of the one found in the Goodspeed (2000) for the OCDE countries. Besley and Rosen 
(1998) and Hayashi and Boadway (2001), found also a negative sign of the federal tax rate in the 
cases of  taxation of cigarettes and gasoline in the United States and business income in Canada, 
respectively. However, it is hard to compare the taxation of personal income and the taxation of 
goods and business income.            
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From the theoretical point of view, as pointed out in section I, the effect of the changes in the 
federal rate on provincial tax rates is ambiguous, and we are only able to determine these signs 
empirically. Our results from the first difference model and from the logarithmic form model 
indicate that if federal tax rate increases, the revenue of provinces decreases and so to set the 
same level of public goods as before, the province will have to increase its taxes rates. Also, we 
have evidence from our estimations that the marginal cost of public funds decreases as the 
federal tax rate increases, leading to a positive effect on the provincial tax rate. We conclude also 
that due to these vertical externalities, the provincial tax rate set in a way that is higher than what 
would be optimal from a social point of view. 
 
3.4.2 Horizontal Tax Interaction and Horizontal Externalities 
 
The horizontal interaction is much more apparent in our results as all our estimations reveal a 
significant and positive coefficient of the variable competing tax rate for both criteria. Our results 
coincide with the ones found for the taxation of business income in Canada by Hayashi and 
Boadway (2001) and for the taxation of personal income in the United States and Canada by 
Esteller-Moré and Solé-Ollé (2001) and Esteller-Moré and Solé-Ollé (2002). Also, we find that 
using the criterion to calculate the competing tax rate based on Esteller-Moré and Solé-Ollé 
(2002) the coefficients of the competing tax rate are larger than the ones estimated with the GDP 
criterion. We can deduce from the theoretical model and from our estimations that even if the 
marginal benefit of public goods decreases in province i followed by the increase of the tax rate 
of province j (as we have inflow of tax base to province i we may not have a decrease in province 
i s tax rate. This may be explained by the uncertain effect on the marginal cost of public funds. 
However, as we find positive coefficients for the competing provincial tax rate, the effect of the 
decrease in the marginal cost of public funds in province i seems to offset the effect of the 
decrease in the marginal benefit of public goods. 
 
3.4.3 Equalization Grants 
 
In our theoretical model, we expected that the existence of equalization grants would lead to 
distortionary policies whereby the provinces set tax rates too high. Esteller-Moré and Solé-Ollé 
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(2002) found a positive and significant relation between equalization grants and provincial 
personal income tax rates. Smart (2007) also finds a positive and significant effect of 
equalization grants in tax rates. However, our estimates do not allow us to reach such a 
conclusion. Actually, the coefficients of the dummy variable equalization are all positive and 
their magnitudes are very small, but none of them, with exception of the DOLS estimation with 
the competing tax rate 2, were significant.   
 
3.4.4 Control Variables 
 
Three of our control variables were significant: population under 15, population over 65, and 
income per capita. The coefficient of the variable income per capita is negative; richer 
populations have lower taxation. The population over 65 has a positive sign, in contrast with the 
variable population under 15, which has a negative sign. The unemployment rate has a positive 
sign in all cases, but is not significant. Finally, we surprisingly did not find evidence that the 
transfers per capita have an influence on provincial tax rates, at least not contemporaneously. 
These results are different than the ones obtained by Esteller-Moré and Solé-Ollé (2002). 
However, comparing the coefficients of the control variables of our estimations may not be 
useful in this case, as their model presents different specifications.  
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
The purpose of this paper was to investigate empirically vertical and horizontal tax interaction in 
a federation as a consequence of the taxation of the same tax base. We showed in section I that 
the sign of such interactions can only be determined empirically. In order to test empirically 
theses fiscal interactions, we calculated the effective provincial and federal personal income tax 
rates. We calculated the competing tax rates using two different criteria and used a dummy 
variable for equalization grants was included in an attempt to establish if this particularity of the 
Canadian system influences the provincial tax rates. In particular, our research differs from the 
other studies of tax interaction as we considered the possibility of non-stationary and 
cointegrated series in the context of panel data.  
 
The results of our estimations confirm tax interaction and the presence of both vertical and 
horizontal externalities. We have evidence of a positive reaction by provinces given an increase 
in the federal tax rates. However, we could not reach this conclusion from the DOLS estimation. 
The results also suggest that the provincial rates are positively affected by the changes in 
competing tax rates, even using different criteria for calculating the competing tax rates. The 
signs of our estimations for the federal tax rates and provincial tax rates coincide with the studies 
regarding the taxation of personal income done by Esteller-Moré and Solé-Ollé (2001) and 
Esteller-Moré and Solé-Ollé (2002). It would be interesting to extend the model to consider more 
periods and particularly to use statutory tax rates as opposed to effective rates.  
 
Regarding the equalization grants, we could not affirm that it has an influence on the province’s 
tax decisions. This result was not expected, as other studies showed positive reaction of 
provincial tax rates of equalization payments. The model could be reworked and include the 
amount of equalization grants as opposed to just a dummy variable to fully grasp the effect of 
these. 
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